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The Road to Fourth Amendment Erosion is Paved
with Good Intentions: Examining Why Florida Should
Limit the Community Caretaker Exception
Matthew C. Shapiro

∗

I. INTRODUCTION
If a well-intentioned police officer is performing acts unrelated to
criminal activity, should he be allowed to enter your home without a
warrant? The setting is the small town of Mayberry, North Carolina,
and the time is 6:30 in the evening. Sheriff Andy Griffith has just
stepped into the police station when he receives a call from Main
Street Elementary School stating that local gas station attendant,
Gomer Pyle, never picked up his son. Because the school is unable to
contact Mr. Pyle, Sheriff Griffith proceeds to drive the six-year-old
child home. In the past, Griffith, a well-meaning and affable officer,
has been known to perform many duties within the town that are
completely removed from his role as a crime-fighter. At the moment,
he seeks to perform yet another task unrelated to combating criminal
activity by reuniting a child with his absent-minded father. Even
though the Pyle residence appears to be empty, and there are no signs
of an emergency, Sheriff Griffith enters the home. Once inside, the
sheriff discovers drugs and arrests Mr. Pyle when he returns home
slightly thereafter. Was Andy Griffith’s entrance into the home a
search that would ordinarily be illegal under the Fourth Amendment?
If so, should his actions be excused based on our society’s need to
have police officers involved in protective actions that go beyond traditional notions of law enforcement duties?
Fundamental to our system of government is the idea that freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is an enumerated protection guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. At the essence of this
∗
J.D., Florida International University, 2011; B.A., Florida State University, 2008. I would
like to first thank my wife, Kimberly Ann Milligan Shapiro. Her love has always been a constant
source of inspiration. I would also like to thank my parents, Dr. Philip and Marsha Shapiro,
whose support and encouragement has been immeasurable; the Honorable Richard B. Orfinger
for serving as a mentor, both on this project and throughout my legal career; and Professor
Megan A. Fairlie for acting as my advisor on this comment.
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amendment stands the ideal that “a man’s home is his castle,” and
1
thus, it enjoys a stringent safeguarding from government intrusion.
Nevertheless, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the need for privacy, are constantly being balanced
against another important interest – the desire to have police officers
not only protect us from crime, but also to provide what have come to
2
be known as community caretaking functions.
The ability of police officers to perform warrantless searches,
while acting as a caretaker, is relatively settled: as long as police are
acting in a role divorced from that of a crime-fighter, a warrantless
search of an automobile or other form of transportation is constitu3
tional. The issue dividing jurisdictions is whether the community
caretaker exception should extend into the home. In light of the recent Florida case of Ortiz v. State, this comment will argue that the
community caretaker doctrine was never intended to apply to warrantless searches of homes, and that if allowed to do so, the State risks
4
unnecessary curtailment of citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights. As
such, Florida courts must continue to steadfastly recognize the United
States Supreme Court’s decision to limit the scope of the community
5
caretaker doctrine.
The community caretaker exception was first introduced in Cady
6
v. Dombrowski. There, the Supreme Court officially recognized that

1
Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 132 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that the fundamental principle
behind the Fourth Amendment is that a man’s home is his castle); see also ROBERT M. BLOOM,
SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS 49 (2003).
2
Today, “[a] police officer is a ‘jack-of-all-emergencies.’” United States v. RodriguezMorales, 929 F.2d 780, 784-85 (1st Cir. 1991). “[He] is expected to aid those in distress, combat
actual hazards . . . and provide an infinite variety of services to preserve and protect community
safety.” Id. at 784-85.
3
See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447-48 (1973); Ray v. Township of Warren,
626 F.3d 170, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Erikson, 991 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1993);
State v. Gill, 755 N.W.2d 454, 458 (N.D. 2008); Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274, 280 n.1 (Fla. 2005);
Wood v. Commonwealth, 497 S.E.2d 484, 486-87 (Va. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Alexander, 721 A.2d
275, 279-80 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998); People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 913-14 (Mich. 1993).
4
Even though the community caretaker exception does not lend itself to a visualization
of police officers combing through bedroom drawers in order to obtain evidence of a crime, a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is nevertheless taking place. Whenever the
government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable, a
search has occurred. See Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d 177, 193 (Fla. 2010).
5
The Florida Constitution requires that courts construe search and seizure issues in accordance with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment:
“The right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures . . . shall not be violated . . . . This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th
Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court.” FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (emphasis added); see also Cady, 413 U.S. at 439 (noting the
constitutional difference between house and car).
6
413 U.S. 433 (1973).
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police officers provide certain community caretaking functions that
are “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition
7
of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” After identifying a difference in privacy expectations between motor vehicles
and dwelling places, the Court concluded that certain types of caretaking searches were not unreasonable, and thus, a warrant was unneces8
sary for their undertaking. From this premise arose the community
caretaker exception.
In the time since Cady, courts have been inconsistent in their interpretation of the community caretaker doctrine. While some decisions have steadfastly recognized that the caretaker exception applies
9
only to vehicles, other courts have expanded the doctrine to allow
10
warrantless searches within the home. Many of these expansionist
courts are merely confusing Cady with already-existing Fourth
Amendment exceptions by labeling them all under the broad heading
11
of “community caretaking functions.” As each Fourth Amendment
exception has its own carefully-delineated justifications, standards, or
even lack thereof, this is a dangerous practice.

7

Id. at 441.
Id. at 439. “Although vehicles are ‘effects’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, ‘for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference between
houses and cars.’” Id. (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)). Specifically, because of the frequency with which vehicles become disabled or are involved in accidents, police
contact with them is substantially greater than contact with a home. Id. at 440-41.
9
See, e.g., United States v. Erikson, 991 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Pichany, 687 F.2d 204, 208 (7th Cir. 1982); State v. Gill, 755 N.W.2d 454, 459-60 (N.D. 2008); Riggs
v. State, 918 So. 2d 274, 279 (Fla. 2005); Wood v. Commonwealth, 497 S.E.2d 484, 487 (Va. Ct. App.
1998); People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910, 914-15 (Mich. 1993).
10 See, e.g., United States v. Nord, 586 F.2d 1288, 1290-91 (8th Cir. 1978) (affirming the right
of the police to be on the premises as part of routine community caretaking functions); United
States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1522 (6th Cir. 1996) (allowing warrantless entry of a home to quell
loud music); People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 934-35 (Cal. 1999) (finding that a warrantless search was
justified under community caretaking exception); Troy v. Ohlinger, 475 N.W.2d 54, 57-58 (Mich.
1991) (holding that an officer was justified to enter residence as part of community caretaker
function).
11 Although there are many established exceptions to the warrant requirement, this comment will solely focus on two aside from the community caretaker doctrine. First, there is the
exigent circumstances exception, which applies when police are searching for evidence or perpetrators of a crime. See discussion infra Part II.B; Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 278; Arango v. State, 411 So.
2d 172, 174 (Fla. 1982). When invoking the exigent circumstance exception, the government
must demonstrate a grave emergency whereby there is not time to secure a warrant. Ray, 981
P.2d at 933. Second, the emergency aid exception grants police entrance to a residence to preserve life or render first aid, provided there is no intent to arrest or search. See discussion infra
Part II.C.; Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 280 (citing Hornblower v. State, 351 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1977)); see also
Ray, 981 P.2d at 934 (advancing the idea that not all “caretaker” functions should be judged by
same standard).
8
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The Fourth Amendment was created based on a societal expecta12
tion of privacy within our dwellings. In fact, physical entry of the
home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
13
Amendment is directed. To permit police officers to enter a residence, when they are acting solely within their community caretaker
roles, would be to create yet another exception and thus risk having it
14
envelope the general rule. As Justice Scalia once stated, “the ‘warrant’ requirement [has] become so riddled with exceptions that it [is]
15
basically unrecognizable.” Following the ongoing debate as to the
scope of the community caretaker doctrine in Ortiz v. State, it is important that Florida courts definitively recognize that the doctrine
16
does not and should not extend to warrantless searches of the home.
Firmly rooted exceptions, with clear-cut standards, already exist to aid
17
law enforcement officers in perceived emergency situations.
Part II of this comment provides a historical understanding of the
principles behind the Fourth Amendment and addresses various recognized exceptions that have impacted courts’ applications of Cady.
Part III affirms that community caretaker searches, despite being devoid of any criminal activity, do invoke Fourth Amendment protections. Part IV surveys various jurisdictions’ interpretations of Cady,
placing emphasis on how confusion of already-existing doctrines,
along with disregard for the express language in Cady, has largely
been the cause of unnecessary expansion. Part V examines Florida’s
historical approach to the doctrine and analyzes why the recent decision in Ortiz v. State should have been decided solely on the basis of
the emergency aid doctrine. Finally, Part VI considers the dangers
posed by applying the Cady doctrine to dwellings and suggests that
Florida courts steadfastly and expressly limit this Fourth Amendment
exception to vehicles.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution grants:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
12

See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
Id. at 586-87.
14 Ray, 981 P.2d at 941 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (“[S]uch an exception threatens to swallow the
rule that absent a showing of true necessity, the . . . right to security and privacy in one's home
must prevail.”).
15 BLOOM, supra note 1, at 102.
16 See generally Ortiz v. State, 24 So. 3d 596 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (en banc) (debating the proper scope of community caretaker exception), appeal denied, 37 So. 3d 848 (Fla. 2010).
17 See discussion infra Parts II.B-II.C.
13
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not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
18
seized.
To comprehend the meaning behind this text, as well as fully understand why protection of the home is the crux of the Fourth Amendment, it is important to first grasp the historical developments that
brought about its creation. By understanding its history, one can better evaluate the development of the amendment through judicial con19
struction.
The sanctity of one’s home has long been considered a tenet of
20
British liberty. William Pitt, a British politician in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries, expressed this sentiment unequivocally: “The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the
forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake . . . the rain
21
may enter; but the King of England may not[.]” During America’s
Revolutionary Period, colonists continued to support this ideal by
expressing their grievances over the enforcement of tax laws by
22
searches that were conducted absent evidence of wrongdoing. Subsequent to the colonies declaring their independence, several states
23
adopted constitutional safeguards regulating searches.
Following the conclusion of the war and a brief period of governance under the Articles of Confederation, it became apparent that a
24
stronger form of centralized government was necessary. Throughout
the debates over whether to ratify the proposed Constitution, AntiFederalists argued strongly against the prospective government having
25
the power to conduct general searches. Richard Henry Lee, a prominent member of Congress, and a well-known Anti-Federalist, described protection from search and seizure as a right that, if not guar26
anteed, would be fatal to ratification. Based on the need to achieve a
18

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19 (1966).
20 Id. at 19-20.
21 Id. at 25.
22 ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1789- 1868 (2006).
23 LANDYNSKI, supra note 19, at 38.
24 Primary
Documents in American History, the Articles of Confederation,
http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/articles.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
25 TASLITZ, supra note 22, at 43.
26 Id. Although they eventually ratified the Constitution, Virginia’s convention recommended that the first Congress include a passage “that every free person be ‘secure from all
unreasonable searches and seizures’ and that warrants be based on ‘legal and sufficient cause.’”
Id.
19
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compromise between the Federalist and Anti-Federalist factions,
James Madison proposed the Bill of Rights – a series of articles pro27
tecting what were considered the basic principles of liberty. Included
in this draft proposal was what would become the Fourth Amendment
28
to the United States Constitution.
The relationship between the two Fourth Amendment clauses is
unambiguous. The first clause, granting people the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures, stated the entitlement to be
29
free from arbitrary governmental invasion. In addition, it empha30
sized the requirements for a valid search. The second clause interpreted the first by stating what kind of search was reasonable: a search
31
carried out under the requirements stated in the Fourth Amendment.
Today, protection of personal privacy expectations against unwarranted intrusion by the State remains the key function of the Fourth
32
Amendment. Specifically, “physical entry of the home is the chief
evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is di33
rected.” As is crucial to understanding why the holding in Cady must
be limited to automobiles, of all the zones of privacy expectation,
“[t]he home enjoys the strongest expectation of privacy and maximum
Fourth Amendment protection. This stems from the intent of the
Framers to ensure the sanctity of the home from invasion by the gov34
ernment.” However, it is also important to note that not all expectations of privacy receive the same degree of protection. “Whether an
expectation of privacy is reasonable often depends on the physical
35
setting involved.” The farther one moves from the boundaries of the
36
home, the less the expectation of privacy is present. The idea that
privacy expectations vary based upon physical location is reflected in
the way the Court succinctly differentiates between the automobile
37
and the home in Cady.
27 Exploring Constitutional Conflicts, the Bill of Rights: Its History and Significance,
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/billofrightsintro.html (last visited Nov. 6,
2011).
28 See id.
29 LANDYNSKI, supra note 19, at 43.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (recognizing that the overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy against intrusion).
33 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
34 BLOOM, supra note 1, at 49.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973). “We made it clear in Preston that
whether a search . . . is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends
upon the facts and circumstances of each case and pointed out . . . that searches of cars that are
constantly moveable may make the search of a car without a warrant a reasonable one although
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Despite stringent constitutional protection when it comes to the
domestic threshold, the Court has made it clear that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit all warrantless searches; some searches
may be deemed reasonable based on the totality of the circum38
stances. In determining whether a warrantless search is reasonable,
courts must balance two important factors: (1) an individual’s Fourth
Amendment interest to be free, and (2) the search’s promotion of a
39
legitimate governmental interest. Keeping this crucial balance in
mind, the Supreme Court has chosen to delineate certain exceptions
to the presumption that a warrantless search is unreasonable. A firm
understanding of these exceptions will elucidate how courts are interchanging established doctrines; the end result being the wrongful extension of the community caretaker exception.
A. The Community Caretaker Doctrine – Cady v. Dombrowski
In Cady v. Dombrowski, the Supreme Court recognized that police officers frequently perform functions that are unrelated to their
40
role as crime-fighters. These duties, undertaken with a concern for
the general safety of the public, are often grouped under the descrip41
tion of community caretaking functions. “Caretaking functions are
performed by police officers because we expect them to take those
steps that are necessary to ‘ensure the safety and welfare of the citi42
zenry at large.’”
In Cady, an off-duty, intoxicated Illinois police officer crashed his
43
rental car while in Wisconsin. Acting under the belief that Chicago
police were required to carry their service revolvers at all times, and
not having found a revolver on Cady’s person, Wisconsin police officers looked into the car’s front seat and glove compartment for the
44
weapon. No revolver was found and the car was towed to a pri45
vately-owned garage. After being formally arrested for drunk driv-

the result might be opposite in a search of a home . . . or other fixed location.” (emphasis added)
(citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366-67 (1964)).
38 See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).
39 People v. Bennett, 949 P.2d 947, 944 (Cal. 1998) (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 113 (1984)).
40 Cady, 413 U.S. at 441.
41 Id.
42 Ortiz v. State, 24 So. 3d 596, 600 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting 3 LAFAVE,
SEARCH & SEIZURE § 5.4(c), at 201-02 (4th ed. 2004)).
43 Cady, 413 U.S. at 435-36.
44 Id. at 436.
45 Id.
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ing, the respondent was taken to a local hospital where he lapsed into
46
a coma and was hospitalized overnight for observation.
While one of the Wisconsin policemen remained at the hospital,
the other returned to the garage where the car had been stored in or47
der to further search for the respondent’s revolver. Upon opening
the car door, the officer found a flashlight that “appeared to have ‘a
48
few spots of blood on it.’” The officer then opened the locked trunk
49
and discovered various items covered in blood. Upon receiving additional information from the respondent, a body was located on a farm
50
in a nearby county. After a habeas corpus petition was denied by the
federal district court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the search of the trunk had been
51
unconstitutional.
On appeal, the Supreme Court began its analysis with the firmlyrooted assumption that “a search of private property without proper
consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless . . . authorized by a valid search war52
rant.” The decision further stated, “[a]lthough vehicles are ‘effects’
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment . . . there is a constitu53
tional difference between houses and cars.” “[The difference] stems
both from the ambulatory character of the [car] and from the fact that
extensive . . . noncriminal contact with automobiles will bring local
54
officials in ‘plain view’ of evidence[.]” Justice Brennan stated that
“because of . . . the frequency with which a vehicle can become disabled or involved in an accident . . . [police] contact with automobiles
55
will be substantially greater than . . . contact in a home or office.”
This noted distinction is of considerable importance given that when
courts expand the community caretaker doctrine into the domestic
realm, they are applying a baseline standard of reasonableness rather
than considering the enhanced protection that a home is supposedly
56
afforded. This interchangeability was never intended by the Court.
46

Id.
Id. at 436-37. Officer Weiss stated that the effort to find the revolver was “standard
procedure” in the department. Id. at 437.
48 Id. at 437.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 437-38.
51 Dombrowski v. Cady, 471 F.2d 280, 286 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding that the search could not
be upheld on the basis of the “plain view” doctrine).
52 Cady, 413 U.S. at 439 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967)).
53 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 299 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)).
54 Id. at 442.
55 Id. at 441.
56 See, e.g., United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d 1232, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2005); Laney v.
State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 933 (Cal. 1999);
State v. Alexander, 721 A.2d 275, 279 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998).
47
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In determining that the search of the trunk was not unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, the Court placed emphasis on the fact
that the officer was justifiably acting based on concern for the safety
of the public:
Local police officers . . . frequently investigate vehicle accidents
in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what
. . . may be described as community caretaker functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evi57
dence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.
In the Court’s opinion, although the officer had not obtained a warrant before searching the vehicle, his intrusion was nevertheless reasonable in order to protect the safety of the public should the gun
58
have been removed from the vehicle. The judgment of the Court of
59
Appeals was reversed.
Unfortunately, Cady neither thoroughly discussed the standard of
suspicion necessary for police to execute a search when performing
caretaker functions, nor did it expressly state the extent to which the
home would be protected. Instead, the Court merely implied that the
standard necessary to invoke the community caretaker exception was
60
that of reasonableness: “Given the known facts, would a prudent and
reasonable officer have perceived a need to act in the proper dis61
charge of his or her community caretaking functions?” Granted, the
ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonable62
ness. Nevertheless, there remains a general agreement that, unless a
carefully-defined exception applies, a search of private property is
63
unreasonable absent a valid search warrant.
Naturally, the question then becomes, is the community caretaker
exception carefully defined to the point such that a valid search warrant is unnecessary? As far as the Court is concerned, when it comes
to automobile searches, based upon the expectation of privacy associ64
ated with them, reasonableness is generally a satisfactory standard.
The problem with allowing “reasonableness” to also serve as a general

57

Cady, 413 U.S. at 441 (emphasis added).
Id. at 447-48.
59 Id. at 450.
60 Id. at 439.
61 Matthew Bell, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness: Why Utah Courts Should Embrace
the Community Caretaking Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 10 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 3, 3
(2005) (quoting People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 937 (Cal. 1999)).
62 Cady, 413 U.S. at 439.
63 Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967) (stating that a search of private
property is generally unreasonable absent a search warrant).
64 Cady, 413 U.S. at 439-40 (citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366-67 (1964)).
58

360

FIU Law Review

[6:351

standard for warrantless home searches is that almost any time an
officer is performing a function devoid of crime-fighting intent, they
would have free reign to enter ones’ dwelling absent a warrant. Furthermore, what is “reasonable” is a matter of opinion that will differ
from one person to the next. This vast, all-encompassing, looselydefined standard in no way harmonizes with the imbedded ideal that
invasion of the home is the “chief evil” against which the Fourth
65
Amendment protection was designed.
B.

Exigent Circumstances

Another well-established warrantless search exception exists for
emergencies or dangerous situations known as “exigent circum66
stances.” “Where safety is threatened and time is of the essence . . .
the need to protect life and to prevent serious bodily injury provides
67
justification for an otherwise invalid entry.” An important distinction
between the caretaker and exigent circumstance exceptions is that the
68
latter applies when the police are acting in their crime-fighting roles.
When the government invokes the exigent circumstances exception,
the entrenched presumption that warrantless entry of a home is un69
reasonable must be rebutted. In order to do so, the government must
demonstrate a “‘grave emergency’ that ‘makes a warrantless search
70
imperative to the safety of the police and the community.’” In addition, the officer must have acted on probable cause, and in good faith,
71
based on the totality of the circumstances. Any exigencies supporting a warrantless entry must be known by the police prior to entry of
72
the premises.
As the Florida Supreme Court has noted, the situations under
which exigent circumstances have been applied are “few in number

65

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274, 278 (Fla. 2005) (recognizing that a warrant is not required
when “exigent circumstances” are present).
67 Id. (quoting Arango v. State, 411 So. 2d 172, 174 (Fla. 1982)).
68 Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Compare Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740, 748-54 (1984) (finding where officers entered the appellant’s residence and arrested
him after receiving information that he was driving under the influence, no exigent circumstances existed), with Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (introducing the emergency aid
doctrine and holding it to apply when the police are acting to protect or preserve life).
69 See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750.
70 Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 278 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 191 (1990)).
71 Seibert v. State, 923 So. 2d 460, 468 (Fla. 2006) (stating that whether exigent circumstances are present is evaluated based on totality of circumstance); see State v. Wakeford, 953
P.2d 1065, 1069 (Mont. 1998) (articulating probable cause and good faith as exigent circumstance
requirements).
72 United States v. Warner, 843 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir. 1988).
66
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73

and carefully delineated.” Included among the recognized uses of
exigent circumstances is the pursuit of a fleeing felon, the prevention
74
of evidence destruction, and searches incident to lawful arrest. Federal courts have characterized exigent circumstances as existing within
four general categories: (1) hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; (2) imminent
destruction of evidence; (3) the need to prevent a suspect’s escape;
75
and (4) a risk of danger to the police or to others. Although the
United States Supreme Court has had the opportunity to broaden this
exception, it has “steadfastly declined this invitation:”
Our rejection of such claims is not due to a lack of appreciation
of the difficulty and importance of effective law enforcement, but
rather to our firm commitment to “the view of those who wrote
the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person’s home . . . may not
be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in en76
forcement of the criminal law.”
From a policy standpoint, the exigent circumstance exception
stands as recognition that, as a practical concern, a warrant is not always able to be secured in time for police officers to carry out their
77
crime-fighting duties in an emergency. Criminal investigation often
demands immediate action. Even though the exigent circumstances
exception serves to override the need to obtain a warrant, it remains
steadfastly limited in its application and should always satisfy the
aforementioned carefully-delineated standards.
C.

Emergency Aid Doctrine

Of the three Fourth Amendment exceptions discussed in this
comment, the emergency aid doctrine presents the greatest challenge
when it comes to proper categorization. Under this exception, police
may enter a residence without a warrant when the purpose of the en78
try is to provide immediate medical aid or assistance. Most impor-

73

Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 279.
Id. at 278-79 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding that the
police acted reasonably upon entering a house to search for a man described as being involved in
an armed robbery); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (stating the officer might
reasonably have believed he was confronted with an emergency when the delay necessary to
obtain a warrant threatened destruction of evidence); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63
(1969) (holding there was reasonableness of the officer in searching the arrested person to remove possible weapons).
75 United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1515 (6th Cir. 1996).
76 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 192 (1990) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
393 (1978)).
77 See BLOOM, supra note 1, at 102.
78 Commonwealth v. Snell, 705 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Mass. 1999).
74
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tantly, the impetus for entry may not be related to gathering evidence
79
of criminal activity. In determining whether a search was justified
under the emergency aid exception, most courts have looked to the
objective reasonableness of the officer’s belief in the existence of a
80
medical emergency. Moreover, a search under this exception will
only be upheld to the extent that it was necessary to resolve the emer81
gency situation.
Historically, the exception was first officially discussed in Mincey
82
v. Arizona. In this case, during a narcotics raid, an undercover police
83
officer was shot and killed. Shortly thereafter, homicide detectives
arrived on the scene and conducted a four-day warrantless search of
84
the petitioner’s apartment. After being convicted of murder, the petitioner argued that the evidence from the warrantless search should
85
not have been admitted. In response, the State contended that a
categorical exception to the warrant requirement existed since a possible homicide presents an emergency situation demanding immediate
86
87
action. Although the Court rejected this line of reasoning, it did
officially recognize the rendering of emergency aid as a Fourth
Amendment exception:
We do not question the right of the police to respond to emergency situations. Numerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers
from making warrantless entries and searches when they rea88
sonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.
The creation of the emergency aid exception serves as recognition
that the preservation of life and the rendering of emergency aid are
89
imperative enough to circumvent the requirement of a warrant. Sim79

Id.
See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274,
278-79 (Fla. 2005); Ortiz v. State, 24 So. 3d 596, 603 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
81 BLOOM, supra note 1, at 104.
82 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
83 Id. at 387.
84 Id. at 389.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 392. The State also argued that the search of the petitioner’s apartment did not
invade any constitutionally protected right of privacy since, by shooting an officer, Mincey forfeited any reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment. Id. at 391. This contention was
rejection by the Court. Id. at 391-92.
87 Id. “[A] four-day search that included opening dresser drawers and ripping up carpets
can hardly be rationalized in terms of the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency search.”
Id. at 393.
88 Id. (emphasis added).
89 Mary Elisabeth Naumann, The Community Caretaker Doctrine: Yet Another Fourth
Amendment Exception, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 331 (1999).
80
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ilar to a scenario involving exigent circumstances, the need for haste
serves to justify a decrease in privacy rights: “[s]ince emergency aid
presents a greater urgency than other caretaking functions, courts
90
generally permit a greater degree of intrusion upon privacy . . . .”
Even so, courts still require that the previously-referenced standards
91
be fulfilled in order for the warrantless search to be upheld.
Because the Supreme Court did not outright recognize an “emergency aid exception,” but rather mentioned it in its dicta, subsequent
92
application has been inconsistent.
The Florida Supreme Court,
unlike the United States Supreme Court, has addressed the issue several times and has upheld warrantless entries motivated by feared
93
medical emergencies. Given that the emergency aid doctrine and the
exigent circumstances exception both involve emergencies requiring
94
immediate action, courts have often used them interchangeably. Furthermore, because rendering aid in a medical emergency is a type of
caretaking function devoid of criminal purpose, courts have also categorized the emergency aid doctrine as a subcategory of the commu95
However, the exceptions are not internity caretaker doctrine.
96
changeable due to their different purposes. Since the emergency aid
doctrine requires that a search be devoid of any criminal investiga97
tion, officers performing warrantless searches that are related to
criminal activity must justify their actions using exigent circum98
stances. Although similar, the two doctrines are not identical due to
99
a narrow distinction:

90

Bell, supra note 61, at 20.
See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
92 Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274, 279 (Fla. 2005).
93 Id. at 280.
94 Naumann, supra note 89, at 332 (citing State v. Jones, 947 P.2d 1030, 1036-37 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1997)).
95 Id. at 330. It can be argued that the community caretaker doctrine is broad and actually
encompasses three smaller Fourth Amendment exceptions: (1) the emergency aid exceptions; (2)
the automobile impoundment doctrine; and (3) the public servant exception. Id. The common
element in all three of these exceptions is that they are totally divorced from criminal activity.
See People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 933 (Cal. 1999) (holding that the emergency aid doctrine is a subcategory of community caretaker doctrine); Naumann, supra note 89, at 330. For the purposes of
this comment, the term “community caretaker doctrine” will be used to refer to what some jurisdictions would label as the “public servant” exception. See Naumann, supra note 89, at 338.
96 Id. at 332.
97 “The ‘emergency exception’ permits police to enter and investigate private premises to
preserve life . . . or to render first aid, provided they do not enter with an accompanying intent to
arrest or search.” Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 280; see also Commonwealth v. Snell, 705 N.E.2d 236, 243
(Mass. 1999).
98 Naumann, supra note 89, at 332-33.
99 Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (noting difference between
emergency doctrine and community caretaker doctrine).
91
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Under the emergency doctrine, the officer has an immediate, reasonable belief that he or she must act to “protect or preserve life
or avoid serious injury.” On the other hand, under the Cady doctrine, the officer “might or might not believe there is a difficulty
requiring his general assistance.” Therefore, while both doctrines
are based on an officer’s reasonable belief in the need to act pursuant to his or her “community caretaking functions,” the emergency doctrine is limited to the functions of protecting or pre100
serving life or avoiding serious injury.
III. COMMUNITY CARETAKER FUNCTIONS TRIGGER FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTION
Courts have often had difficulty determining whether the community caretaking doctrine involves searches that garner judicial at101
tention under the Fourth Amendment. As Judge Torpy expressed in
Ortiz v. State, the purpose of a search warrant is to ensure that conclu102
sions as to probable cause are drawn. Since probable cause is a concept that is confined to criminal investigations, it could be argued that
a warrant would be unnecessary when police are performing functions
103
totally devoid from the detection of crime. This issue, as it relates to
the community caretaker analysis, is important in that “[i]f courts do
not classify caretaker encounters . . . as searches, [such] encounters
[will] not invoke Fourth Amendment considerations that require an
104
evaluation of the actions . . . .”
Courts that believe warrants are inapplicable during community
caretaking searches are misguided in two aspects: first, the Fourth
105
Amendment’s protections are not limited to police searches, and
second, “the Fourth Amendment applies even if the conduct falls short
106
of a ‘full-blown search.’” The Supreme Court has held that it would
be “anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are
fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is
107
suspected of criminal behavior.” The Fourth Amendment also regulates the conduct of fire marshals, building inspectors, and those whose
“purpose may be to locate and abate a suspected public nuisance, or

100

Id.
Naumann, supra note 89, at 342.
102 Ortiz v. State, 24 So. 3d 596, 604 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (Torpy, J., concurring)
(citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 371 (1976)).
103 Id. at 604.
104 Naumann, supra note 89, at 342.
105 Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
106 Naumann, supra note 89, at 342 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
107 Camara, 387 U.S. at 530.
101
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108

If the Fourth
simply to perform a routine periodic inspection.”
Amendment applies to searches that are completely unrelated to
criminal investigation, it would only stand to reason that it also applies
when police officers are performing a search under their role as community caretakers. In addition, a “search occurs when an expectation
of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is in109
Considering a person enjoys the highest expectation of
fringed.”
privacy in their home, it would be reasonable to say that a search occurs when police enter a home, even if only to perform community
110
caretaking functions.
IV. EXPANSION AND RESTRICTION OF THE COMMUNITY CARETAKER
EXCEPTION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Outside of Florida, federal and state courts have varied on
whether to enlarge the caretaker doctrine. In jurisdictions where rulings have extended Cady so as to encompass domestic searches, courts
have erred in two aspects. First, they have often justified their holdings by either mistakenly using exigent circumstance or emergency aid
rationale labeled under the heading of a community caretaking function, or in other instances, have failed to apply an already-existing exception whose carefully-delineated standards offer greater Fourth
111
Amendment protection. Second, they have disregarded the express
language in Cady that distinguished the privacy interests between au112
tomobiles and homes.
One example of confusion among doctrines can be found in Peo113
ple v. Ray. In that matter, the Supreme Court of California upheld a
warrantless search of the defendant’s home based on the officer having entered to perform what the court categorized as “community
114
caretaking functions.” Reacting to information that the defendant’s
apartment door had been open all day and that the inside was in
108

Ortiz, 24 So. 3d at 620 (Cohen, J., dissenting) (citing Michigan v. Tyler 436 U.S. 499, 504

(1978)).
109 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 112 (1984); see also Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d
177 (Fla. 2010).
110 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (recognizing the right to be free from an
unreasonable search is at core of Fourth Amendment).
111 See, e.g., United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1518 (6th Cir. 1995) (discussing “exigent
circumstances”); United States v. Nord, 586 F.2d 1288, 1290-91 (8th Cir. 1978) (noting the individual was in need of medical assistance); Laney v. Texas, 117 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003) (classifying the emergency aid exception as part of community caretaker doctrine); Troy v.
Ohlinger, 475 N.W.2d 54, 56-57 (Mich. 1991) (stating the defendant was in need of medical attention).
112 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
113 People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928 (Cal. 1999).
114 Id. at 931.
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115

shambles, officers went to Ray’s home. Upon arrival, there was con116
cern for the welfare of the people inside. Although they found no
one inside the apartment, the officers did observe a large quantity of
117
what was suspected to be cocaine. In response to the defendant’s
motion to suppress, the prosecution attempted to justify the search
118
based on the exigent circumstances exception. When the admissibility of the evidence ultimately came before the California Supreme
Court, the State urged the court to affirm based on the emergency aid
119
exception, “characterized as a variant of exigent circumstances.”
Applying the emergency aid exception requirements – that there
must be “specific [articulate] facts indicating the need for swift action
to prevent imminent danger to life” – the court held that such stan120
dards had not been met. However, rather than test the applicability
of the exigent circumstance exception, or conclude their inquiry altogether, the court submitted that the community caretaker doctrine
existed for situations such as the present: “Under the community caretaker exception, circumstances short of a perceived emergency may
justify a warrantless entry . . . ‘where the police reasonably believe that
121
the premises have recently been or are being burglarized.’” To enter
a home on the belief that it has been, or is being burglarized, is precisely a police function related to a criminal activity. If there actually
had been an objective belief, based on the totality of the circumstances, that a crime was being committed inside the home, the search
122
could have been justified under the exigent circumstances exception.
When first recognizing a community caretaker exception, the United
States Supreme Court plainly stated that it was meant to be “totally
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence
123
relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” If the officers had in
fact needed to immediately enter the dwelling in order to either stop a
crime or render medical aid, an already-existing exception could have
provided them lawful entrance. Conversely, if there truly was no im-

115

Id at 932.
Id. at 931.
117 Id. at 932.
118 Id. at 931. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals analyzed the facts and the law
under the exigent circumstances exception. Id.
119 Id. at 932-33.
120 Id. at 934.
121 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 3 LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 6.6(a), at 390 (3d ed.
1996)).
122 Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (stating that the exigent circumstances exception applies when police are acting in their crime-fighting roles).
123 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
116
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mediate threat, then the officers should have been required to obtain
a warrant.
Supporting this contention was the concurring opinion of Chief
Justice George, who appropriately concluded that the search was lawful based instead on an application of the exigent circumstances ex124
ception. Citing to case precedent, the Chief Justice noted that exigent circumstances include situations requiring swift action to prevent
125
danger and preserve life. In the present case, based upon the police
dispatch, the condition of the home, and the officer’s own experience,
126
there was reasonable belief that exigent circumstances were present.
Finally, in his dissent, Judge Mosk recognized that the majority
was creating a broad new exception, and, in doing so, obscured the line
at the entrance to the home that the Fourth Amendment had constructed:
Under the . . . newly created exception, entry is permissible, and
incriminating evidence can be seized, when police officers enter a
home merely to ‘find out what is going on’ . . . . Does the lead
opinion’s new exception also permit entry when a door is merely
unlocked? When a neighbor reports that no one is home, or the
127
occupants simply choose not to answer a knock at the door?
Given that the test for the community caretaker exception is “unteth128
ered,” the potential for abuse is great. Allowing officers to conduct
warrantless home searches, absent an immediate threat to the occupants, would be to create an exception that would swallow the general
129
rule of security and privacy. Ultimately, Judge Mosk did not share in
the majority’s belief that law enforcement assistance will “go down130
hill” without recognition of a new exception.
The confusion over when to apply exigent circumstances can also
131
be seen in State v. Alexander. In Alexander, officers entered a home
under the mistaken belief that a breaking and entering was in pro132
gress, and discovered marijuana. Like its California counterpart in
Ray, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals mistakenly found that
“what the officers did . . . was the quintessence of the reasonable per124

Ray, 981 P.2d at 940 (George, J., concurring).
Id.
126 Id. at 938. One officer testified that “from his experience he believed there was a ‘95
percent’ likelihood the premises had been burglarized.” Id. at 931.
127 Id. at 944 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
128 Id.
129 See id.
130 Id.
131 See State v. Alexander, 721 A.2d 275 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998).
132 Id. at 287.
125
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formance of their community caretaking function.” In light of the
above facts, it is clear that the community caretaker exception was
inappropriately applied in this case for two reasons. First, investigating what is believed to be an ongoing breaking and entering is not
devoid from the prevention or detection of crime. It is exactly what
134
the exigent circumstances exception was created to address. Second,
although rendering assistance to people in need is a function that a
police officer undertakes to care for the community, it is not the type
of function that the community caretaker doctrine originally encom135
passed.
The community caretaker doctrine has not only been expanded
based on what truly equates to be exigent circumstances; rather, there
has also been considerable misapplication when it comes to the rendering of emergency aid. In Troy v. Ohlinger, an officer was dispatched to the home of the defendant based on what was reported as
136
an “injury accident.” A bystander told the officer that he heard a
crash and saw a car being driven away by a man who appeared to be
137
injured. The vehicle was found parked outside of the defendant’s
home, appearing as though it had recently been involved in an acci138
dent. After knocking on the door and receiving no response, the
officer shined his flashlight inside a window and witnessed the defen139
dant lying motionless and bleeding. After the officer entered the
home and awoke the defendant, the defendant was charged with “operating a motor vehicle while under the influence . . . and leaving the
140
scene of a personal injury.”
In ruling that the officer was justified to enter the home without a
warrant, the court declared that “the inability to determine, without
entry, whether [the defendant] was injured, justified further police
141
investigation as part of the community caretaker function.” What is
troubling is that the court specifically cites to Mincey, the first Su133 Id. The court stated that, “[h]ad the officers walked away from the scene, they would
have been derelict in their duty.” Id. at 287.
134 Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (noting that the exigent circumstances exception applies when police are acting in their crime-fighting roles).
135 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (“Local police officers . . . frequently
investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what,
for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced
from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal
statute.”).
136 Troy v. Ohlinger, 475 N.W.2d 54, 55 (Mich. 1991).
137 Id. at 55.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 56.
141 Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
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preme Court case to explicitly acknowledge an emergency aid excep142
tion, as validating the warrantless entry. If the court recognized that
the officer entered the dwelling under the belief that the defendant
was in need of immediate aid, why not simply state that the emergency aid exception applied? Granted, the rendering of emergency
aid can arguably be viewed as a community caretaker function in that
143
it is divorced from criminal purpose. Nevertheless, if the home is
given the greatest Fourth Amendment protection, the court would
have been better served to apply a more appropriate exception – the
emergency aid doctrine. Examining the objective reasonableness of
the officer’s belief in a medical emergency, it is clear that the requirements of the emergency aid exception were satisfied: the car parked
outside the home appeared as though it had been in a recent accident,
144
All evidence
and the defendant was bleeding and unconscious.
pointed to an objective belief that the defendant was in need of im145
mediate aid. The inherent danger in this type of misdiagnosis of exceptions is the unnecessary encroachment upon Fourth Amendment
rights. Both the emergency aid and exigent circumstance exceptions
are well-established in nature and require a specific set of circum146
stances.
As a result, they are less open to extension and are not
untethered in nature.
In jurisdictions where the community caretaker doctrine has not
been extended, “courts have turned to language in Cady emphasizing
the constitutional difference between the expectation of privacy in
147
cars and homes.”
In United States v. Erikson, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals made the determination that Cady did not extend to
148
the home. In that case, the government argued that when an officer
looked inside the defendant’s home, the search was protected under
the community caretaker doctrine since there was a belief that a bur-

142 Id. at 56. Mincey v. Arizona was the first Supreme Court case to officially recognize a
Fourth Amendment exception based on the immediate need to render emergency aid: “We do
not question the right of the police to respond to emergency situations. Numerous state and
federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from
making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in
need of immediate aid.” 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (emphasis added).
143 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (listing community caretaking functions
are those totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to
the violation of a criminal statute).
144 Troy, 475 N.W.2d at 55. In determining whether a search is justified under the emergency aid exception, most courts have looked to the objective reasonableness of the officer’s
belief in the existence of a medical emergency. See Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274, 282 (Fla. 2005).
145 See id.
146 Naumann, supra note 89, at 358.
147 Id. at 348.
148 United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529, 533 (9th Cir. 1993).
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glary might have occurred. In reaching its determination that the
community caretaker exception was not applicable, the court analyzed
the language in Cady: “Although it involved a community caretaking
function, Cady clearly turned on the ‘constitutional difference’ between searching a house and searching an automobile. In upholding
the search of Cady's automobile, the Court expressly relied on its
‘previous recognition of the distinction between motor vehicles and
150
dwelling places.’” The court did recognize that in order for police
officers to perform their crime fighting functions, privacy interests
151
Nevertheless, “the exigent circummust sometimes be balanced.
stances exception . . . adequately accommodates these competing in152
terests.”
Similar reliance on the express language in Cady can be found in
153
U.S. v. Pichany. In Pichany, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the search of the defendant’s unlocked warehouse by officers who were not investigating an ongoing crime could not be justi154
fied under the community caretaker exception. “Accepting the government's argument would require us to ignore express language in
the Cady decision confining the ‘community caretaker’ exception to
155
searches involving automobiles.”
One of the best cases in terms of articulating the different Fourth
Amendment exceptions, while limiting Cady, is the Michigan case of
156
People v. Davis. In Davis, police officers received a radio dispatch
157
saying that shots had been fired at a motel. After entering the defendant’s motel room based upon the belief that the defendant was in
158
danger, the officers seized a gun as well as narcotics. The court of
appeals upheld the search based on the community caretaker excep159
tion.
In reversing the decision of the lower court, the Michigan Su160
preme Court began by examining the emergency aid exception. The
decision methodically showed how other courts had used “articulate
standards[,] specifically applicable to emergency aid entries[,]” to

149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160

Id. at 530-31.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 533.
United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 207-09.
Id. at 208.
People v. Davis, 497 N.W.2d 910 (Mich. 1993).
Id. at 911.
Id. at 911-12.
People v. Davis, 473 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
Davis, 497 N.W.2d at 914-15.
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161

judge whether the search was lawful. A common feature was that
police officers had to possess a reasonable belief that such circum162
stances existed. On the other hand, Cady did not list the standard of
suspicion necessary to search protected areas under the community
caretaker exception: “[t]he [Cady] Court’s opinion suggested that
because the police were not looking for any evidence of a crime, they
163
needed no suspicion . . . to ‘search.’” Since the emergency aid exception contains the carefully-delineated standard of reasonable suspicion, “when the police are investigating a situation in which they reasonably believe someone is in need of immediate aid, their actions
should be governed by the emergency aid doctrine, regardless of
whether these actions can also be classified as community caretaking
164
activities.” The reason for this conclusion is that the levels of privacy
165
intrusion between an automobile and a home are dissimilar. It is
because the home receives considerable protection that courts have
seen fit to articulate standards specifically applicable to emergency aid
166
entries. Given that these pronounced standards serve to protect the
fabric of the Fourth Amendment, courts should not seek to apply a
less germane exception whose lack of standard and clear boundaries
create an exception that could arguably erode the Fourth Amendment.
Most importantly, the overarching theme in the cases refusing to
extend the community caretaker doctrine is the recognition that the
Supreme Court carefully considered the differences in constitutional
167
privacy expectations between an automobile and a home. In doing
so, the Court had the opportunity to extend the doctrine beyond vehicles, yet decided otherwise. Moreover, there is the acknowledgment
that when the community caretaker doctrine is applied, instead of a
more applicable, already-existing exception, searches are more prone
to abuse in that caretaking can simply become a pretext for criminal
168
investigations.
Although the Eleventh Circuit has yet to expressly rule on the
boundaries of the community caretaker exception, Florida courts can
infer from the ruling in U.S. v. McGough that the federal court disfa-

161

Id. at 921 (emphasis added).
Id. at 918.
163 Id. at 919.
164 Id. at 921.
165 Id. at 920-21.
166 See id. at 921.
167 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973) (acknowledging the constitutional difference between searches of homes from vehicles based on ambulatory character of the latter).
168 Naumann, supra note 89, at 358-59.
162
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169

vors expansion. In McGough, the defendant locked his five-year-old
170
daughter, Queenice, in his apartment while he ran an errand. After
171
the daughter mistakenly called 911, the police arrived on the scene.
Upon the defendant’s return, he was arrested for reckless conduct and
172
placed in a police car. While waiting for her aunt to arrive, Queenice
was asked by an officer if she would enter the apartment to gather
173
some shoes and clothing. After Queenice stated that she was “too
scared to go in by herself,” an officer picked her up and accompanied
174
her into the apartment. While inside, the officer saw what appeared
175
to be drugs and a revolver. “Queenice pointed to the gun and said
176
‘that’s the gun my father uses to kill people.’” At trial, McGough
argued that the search had been illegal and filed a motion to sup177
press. The government contended that the search was valid since the
officer initially entered the apartment to perform a community care178
taking function.
Addressing the argument, the court noted that it has “never explicitly held that the community caretaking functions of a police offi179
cer [permitted] the warrantless entry into a private home.” In assuming for the sake of the appeal that there was such an exception,
the court still found that the facts in this case did not justify its appli180
cation. When the apartment was searched, McGough was in custody
and Queenice was safe; there was no immediate threat. “Were we to
apply the community caretaking exception in this case, we would undermine the Amendment’s most fundamental premise: searches inside
181
the home, without a warrant, are presumptively unreasonable.”
V. THE COMMUNITY CARETAKER DOCTRINE IN FLORIDA
Florida cases directly addressing the community caretaker doctrine are limited. Until recently, Florida courts acknowledged the existence of the exception, yet none were willing to apply it to the

169 United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that community caretaker doctrine undermines the basic premise of Fourth Amendment).
170 Id. at 1233.
171 Id. The daughter, Queenice, was actually attempting to call her aunt. Id.
172 Id. at 1234.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1235.
178 Id. at 1236.
179 Id. at 1238.
180 Id. at 1239.
181 Id.
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182

home. However, in upholding a warrantless entry initiated to reunite a child with his parents in Ortiz v. State, the Fifth District Court
of Appeal has in effect extended the community caretaker excep183
tion. In addition, Ortiz leaves the impression that confusion over the
borders of the community caretaker doctrine, as well as its relation to
184
previously-mentioned exceptions, still exists. However, before discussing Ortiz, it is important to first outline the history of the community caretaker doctrine within the State.
A. Historical Evolution
In Florida, Cobb v. State was the first case to recognize the com185
munity caretaker doctrine. In upholding the warrantless search of a
vehicle, the court turned to the language of Cady: “Officer Thomas’
actions plainly constituted a part of what the Supreme Court charac186
terized . . . as the community caretaking functions.” “[T]he officer
opened the [car] door, not in order to search . . . but rather [to secure]
187
the vehicle against theft, vandals, and the elements . . . .” Nowhere in
Cobb was it stated or implied that Cady searches could be applied to
the home. Although Florida courts eventually broadened the exception to encompass boats, this is arguably of no consequence since
boats and cars are both ambulatory and come into frequent contact
188
with the public.
The closest Florida has come to considering the adoption of a
warrantless residential search, premised on the community caretaker
189
doctrine, was in Riggs v. State.
In Riggs, sheriff’s deputies were
summoned to an apartment complex after a four-year-old girl had
190
been spotted wandering naked and alone.
Motivated by concern
over the parents’ welfare, as well as the possibility of child abandon191
ment, the deputies searched the complex door to door. The deputies
noticed that every door on the second floor was closed, except for
192
one. Despite knocking loudly and identifying themselves as police,

182

See discussion infra Part V.A.
24 So. 3d 596 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
184 See generally id. (en banc) (attempting to “flesh out” the borders of medical emergency
exception and community caretaking function), appeal denied, 37 So. 3d 848 (Fla. 2010).
185 Cobb. v. State, 378 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
186 Id. at 84.
187 Id. at 83.
188 Castella v. State, 959 So. 2d 1285, 1292 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (acknowledging
caretaker exception usually applies to automobiles).
189 Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2005).
190 Id. at 276.
191 Id.
192 Id.
183
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no one inside the apartment came to the door. “Concerned that
something had happened to the child’s caregiver and that maybe there
194
was a medical concern . . . the deputies entered the apartment.” After entering the apartment, the deputies discovered marijuana along
195
with the petitioner, Riggs.
At trial, Riggs moved to suppress the evidence, stating it was the
196
fruit of an unreasonable search. The State argued that the search
was justified under exigent circumstances, yet the court was not per197
suaded by reason of the fact that the child was already safe. The
Second District Court of Appeal reversed and held that the search
was lawful under the reasonable belief that the child’s caregiver was
198
experiencing an emergency.
Upon review, the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that cer199
tain courts had cited Cady as supporting a medical emergency excep200
tion. Even so, the court was not persuaded to adopt such an approach, and instead upheld the warrantless search based on the equivalent of the emergency aid exception: “We do not rely on Cady . . . because the Court’s analysis was expressly limited to the automobile con201
text.” With this statement, the court unequivocally chose not to expand the community caretaker doctrine beyond the context set forth
in Cady.
B.

Ortiz v. State

Of late, the Fifth District Court of Appeal has unofficially revitalized the community caretaker debate by issuing an opinion that attempted to “[flesh] out the border[] of both the ‘feared medical emergency’ exception . . . and the now well-recognized community caretak-

193

Id. at 276-77.
Id. at 277.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 278.
198 See State v. Riggs, 890 So. 2d 465, 467 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d, 918 So. 2d 274
(Fla. 2005).
199 Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 280 n.1 (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)).
200 Id. Although the court uses the term “medical emergency exception” to reference a
disputed point in Cady v. Dombrowski, see supra note 156, Florida courts generally refer to the
emergency aid doctrine recognized in Mincey v. Arizona as the “emergency exception.” See, e.g.,
Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 280 (recognizing “emergency exception” permits police to enter private
premises to preserve life or render aid); Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d 177, 192 (Fla. 2010) (noting
the Fourth Amendment exception for emergency situation requiring rendering of aid); State v.
Moses, 480 So. 2d 146, 148 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that under “emergency exception,” police do not need a warrant if a life is in danger).
201 Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 280 n.1 (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973)) (emphasis added).
194
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202

ing function of police officers.” In Ortiz, a deputy received a call
from an elementary school after a six-year-old’s parents failed to pick
203
him up and could not be reached by telephone. Following standard
policy procedure, the deputy drove the child to the child’s home in an
effort to take reasonable steps to contact the parents before involving
204
the Department of Children and Families. The child told the deputy
205
that his parents “were or should be home.” In spite of this, no one
appeared to be home, there were no cars in the driveway, and there
206
were no signs of forced entry. The child received no response when
he knocked on the front door. However, the garage door was un207
locked, and the child opened it, possibly with help from the deputy.
Once inside the garage, the deputy could see a light on in the
208
house and entered after being invited in by the child. Upon entering,
209
he announced his presence but received no response. Finding no
one inside, the child took the deputy to the parent’s bedroom where
210
the door was locked from the inside. After knocking, announcing his
presence, and still receiving no answer, the deputy became concerned
211
for the well-being of the parents. Upon unlocking the door and entering the bedroom, the deputy began to look for a body, but instead
212
found cocaine in the bathroom. Ortiz then entered the room and
after admitting that the cocaine was his, was arrested on drug-related
213
charges. At trial, Ortiz moved to suppress the evidence, contending
that exigent circumstances did not justify entry into the locked bed214
room.
In the original panel’s decision, the majority maintained that unlike Riggs, the State had failed to demonstrate a reasonable belief that
the child’s parents were inside the house and in need of medical atten215
tion. When the deputy arrived at the home, there were no cars in the
216
driveway and no evidence of foul play. Concern for the well-being
202

Ortiz v. State, 24 So. 3d 596, 597 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 598.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.. The deputy testified that he believed the child opened the door on his own. However, the officer conceded that he may have helped the child open the door. Id. at 598 n.1.
208 Id. at 598.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 598-99.
214 Id.
215 Ortiz v. State, No. 5D08-1653, slip op. at 7-8 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2009), withdrawn en banc, 24 So. 3d 596 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
216 Id. at 8.
203
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of the parents only materialized after the deputy entered the home
217
and found the locked bedroom. “‘[G]ood intentions notwithstanding, the deputy lacked a reasonable basis to believe that a grave emer218
gency existed . . . .” As there was no exigency demonstrating a justi219
fied warrantless entry, the majority sought to reverse Ortiz’s convic220
tion.
It was within the original dissent, authored by Judge Monaco, that
the community caretaker doctrine was first incorporated into the case:
“In my perspective Florida has already joined the growing number of
courts that recognize that community caretaker function of police officers, or its functional equivalent, the exigent circumstances doctrine .
221
. . .” Judge Monaco acknowledged that Riggs had limited Cady to
automobiles, yet he nevertheless found the majority’s view of the po222
lice officer’s actions to be overly restrictive. In his opinion, not only
was this case analogous to Riggs where the court had allowed a warrantless entry to contend with a feared emergency, but also, the Fourth
Amendment was not intended to prevent “humanitarian activity” as
223
evidenced by the existence of exigent and emergency exceptions.
Ultimately, Ortiz’s conviction was affirmed when the case was heard
224
en banc.
The decision to hear the case en banc was founded on the belief
that the original decision had a potential negative effect on the actions
225
of law enforcement officials. Judge Monaco, whose original dissent
became the majority opinion, once again, cited to Cady for its recogni226
tion that police officers perform caretaking functions. In addition,
an attempt was made to classify the emergency aid exception as a
227
progeny of the community caretaker exception. However, both of
217

Id.
Id. at 10.
219 Exigency is synonymous with emergency. Therefore, when a court sometimes refers to
“exigent circumstances,” they are not remarking on an ongoing criminal emergency associated
with the exigent circumstance exception discussed throughout this paper. See, e.g., Michigan v
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978) (describing a fire as an exigent circumstance).
220 Ortiz, slip op. at 15-16.
221 Id. at 4 (Monaco, J., dissenting).
222 Id.
223 Id. at 2-4. Although those Fourth Amendment exceptions exist to preclude humanitarian deeds, unlike the community caretaker exception, they are widely accepted, and their standards are carefully delineated. See discussion supra Parts II.B-C.
224 Ortiz v. State, 24 So. 3d 596, 603 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
225 Id. at 597. “A rehearing en banc may be granted pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate
Procedure 9.331(a) when the case is of exceptional importance or in order to maintain uniformity in the court’s decisions.” Id.
226 Id. at 600.
227 Id. “[C]ourts have traced the derivation of the emergency doctrine . . . to the recognized
community caretaking function of law enforcement officers.” Id.
218
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the cases referred to as supporting this statement merely cited to Min228
cey as the genesis of this contention. As previously noted, Mincey
simply recognized that a search during an ongoing emergency did not
229
require a warrant. There was never any mention made of an emer230
gency aid exception derived from the principles expressed in Cady.
In determining that the emergency exception used in Riggs applied in this instance, the Ortiz majority sought to answer one question: “[w]hether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the
231
child’s parents might be in need of medical attention.” The answer
to this inquiry was debatable and ultimately split the court. In the
opinion of the majority, the officer could have reasonably concluded
that something was wrong given that (1) the child indicated that his
parents were inside; (2) once inside the garage, the officer noticed a
light on in the house as though someone was home; (3) upon reaching
the master bedroom, the officer noticed the door was locked from the
inside, and (4) the parents were currently an hour and a half late in
232
picking their child up from school.
In contrast, the dissenting opinion authored by Judge Orfinger
underscores the principle that when the government seeks to invoke a
Fourth Amendment exception, it has the burden of rebutting the pre233
sumption of unreasonableness. It was his belief that the government
failed to demonstrate a grave emergency that would make a warrantless search imperative to the safety of the police and of the com234
munity. Prior to the entry of the home, there was no evidence of foul
play, no car was present in the driveway, and the house appeared to be
235
empty.
In short, there was no objective evidence pointing to an
emergency inside the Ortiz residence.
When analyzing Ortiz, the first question that should be asked is,
considering the evidence, was the officer’s search of the home constitutional under an emergency aid exception analysis? The reason that
an inquiry into the legality of the search should begin with the emer236
gency aid doctrine is that it was the exception applied in Riggs. If

228 See United States v. Russell, 436 F.3d 1086, 1090 (9th Cir. 2006) (recognizing the emergency aid doctrine as deriving from the holding in Mincey v. Arizona); see also United States v.
Bradley, 321 F.3d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 2003) (referencing Mincey v. Arizona as the first case to
recognize the emergency aid doctrine).
229 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978).
230 Id.
231 Ortiz, 24 So. 3d at 602.
232 Id. at 602-03.
233 Id. at 610 (Orfinger, J., dissenting).
234 Id. at 611, 613 (citing McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)).
235 Id. at 613.
236 Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2005).
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the majority construes Ortiz and Riggs to be sufficiently similar, then
237
it should follow that both satisfy the emergency aid exception.
In reviewing whether it appeared as though an ongoing emer238
gency existed inside the home, the facts must be assessed objectively.
“As a general rule, the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct [depends] upon the existence of facts available to him at the moment of
239
the search . . . .” When the officer began to open the garage door, he
had seen no lights on within the house and had not yet discovered the
240
locked bedroom door. The only evidence of a potential ongoing
emergency within the house was a six-year-old’s belief that his parents
241
were inside. Conversely, the officers in Riggs were confronted with a
situation that was considerably more attuned to the purpose of the
emergency aid doctrine. Before initiating a search, the officers had
found a child wandering naked and alone, a lighted apartment whose
door was open as though someone had come out, and had received no
242
response from their knocks. Truly, the situation indicated that the
welfare of the child’s parents might be in question. Unlike in Riggs, in
Ortiz, the objective circumstances existing at the time of the search
simply did not provide a basis to believe that there could have been an
243
ongoing emergency.
In Riggs, because the deputies were
“[c]oncerned that ‘something had happened to the child’s caregiver
and that maybe there was a medical concern in there,’ they entered
244
the apartment.” In Ortiz, the officer testified that he went into the
home, not because of a perceived emergency, but because he sought to
245
reunite the child with his parents. Hence, these two cases are dissimilar.

237

Ortiz, 24 So. 3d at 600-01 (citing Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 2005)).
See, e.g., Rolling v. State, 695 So. 2d 278, 293-94 (Fla. 1997). “[I]n determining whether
[an] officer acted reasonably, due weight must be given not to his unparticularized suspicions or
‘hunches,’ but to the reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw . . . .” People v. Ray, 981
P.2d 928, 937 (Cal. 1999) (quoting People v. Block, 499 P.2d 961, 963 (Cal. 1971)).
239 Ray, 981 P.2d at 942 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting People v. Duncan,
720 P.2d 2, 5 (Cal. 1986)).
240 Ortiz, 24 So. 3d at 598. Given that a garage attached to a residence receives Fourth
Amendment protection, the search began when the officer entered the garage. State v. Duhart,
810 So. 2d 972, 975 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (Klein, J., dissenting) (recognizing that a person’s garage is as much a part of his castle as the rest of the home) (quoting United States v.
Oaxaca, 233 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 2000)).
241 See Ortiz, 24 So. 3d at 598.
242 Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 282.
243 In Florida cases, the term “emergency” refers to the need for officers to preserve life or
render emergency aid. See, e.g., Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 280 (recognizing “emergency exception”
permits police to enter private premises to preserve life or render aid).
244 Id. at 277.
245 Ortiz, 24 So. 3d at 613 (Orfinger, J., dissenting).
238
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The next question becomes, if the emergency aid exception was
not applicable, could the search have been justified based on nothing
more than the reasonableness of the officer’s desire to provide the
community caretaking service of reunification? Although the majority never expressly stated that the search should be upheld based on
an exception aside from rendering emergency aid, this contention is
implicit within the opinion: “The officer was fulfilling a laudable police
function in attempting to reunite the child with his missing parents . . .
We give weight to the fact that a proper function of the officer . . . was
246
to attempt to reunite the child with his parents . . . .” This statement,
coupled with the officer’s testimony that he sought to bring about reunification, suggests that the initial phase of the search was based
247
solely on the officer’s community caretaker role. Given that Florida
has never allowed the community caretaker doctrine to allow for a
warrantless search of a home, the search is not justifiable under this
248
exception either. In reaching this conclusion, it is important to recall
the reasons certain jurisdictions improperly extend Cady into the
home.
Improper extension of the community caretaker doctrine occurs
for two reasons: (1) failure to apply already-recognized, more suitable
exceptions and (2) disregard for the language in Cady that expressly
249
limited the exception to automobiles. The majority in Ortiz makes
both of these errors. Turning to the first mistake, instead of strictly
analyzing the search under the emergency aid exception, the court
construes the doctrine to be a part of the community caretaker exception, essentially advocating that the search was lawful both because
there was an ongoing emergency and because of the community care250
taking function of reunification.
By emphasizing the police officer’s attempt to reunify the child
with his parents, it appears as though the majority intuitively recognized that the objective reasonableness of rendering aid was not
251
enough, by itself, to overcome the warrant requirement. In order to
not hinder officers from performing their caretaking functions, the
majority reaches an interesting conclusion placed in context by the
following quote: “The issue always is a comparison of the harm done
by a marginal curtailment of one value with the benefit to another

246

Id. at 602 (majority opinion).
See id. at 617 (Evander, J., dissenting).
248 See id. (interpreting Riggs as implicitly rejecting the community caretaker exception as it
applies to residences); see also Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 280.
249 See discussion supra Part IV.
250 Ortiz, 24 So. 3d at 600, 603.
251 Id. at 602.
247
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value from the curtailment.” According to the court, “the benefit
obtained by allowing officers to act without a warrant in perceived
emergency situations must trump the marginal curtailment of the war253
rant requirement.” In spite of this belief, allowing warrantless entry
into the home to perform caretaking functions is anything but a marginal curtailment. In effect, it is the creation of a broad and unrestricted exception.
The emergency aid doctrine has already been recognized in Florida and has clear-cut standards that exist to protect unnecessary en254
croachment upon Fourth Amendment rights.
If the court truly
wished to adhere to the decision in Riggs by applying a recognized
exception to the warrant requirement, it would have examined the
objective belief of an ongoing emergency at the time the officer entered the garage. In upholding a search where the entry was not predicated on the desire to render emergency aid or medical assistance, the
court endorsed the warrantless search of a home based on what was a
perceived community caretaking function. As previously mentioned,
the danger with upholding a search anchored in caretaking principles
is that the low standard of reasonability, absent delineated standards,
erodes the constitutional line that protects the home from invasions of
privacy.
In justifying a community caretaker search, the only question that
must be asked is, “[g]iven the known facts, would a prudent and reasonable officer have perceived a need to act in the proper discharge of
255
his or her community caretaking functions?” Such a low standard
virtually guarantees access to the home whenever an officer perceives
that entry would be in an individual’s best interest. This broad exception unseats the settled ideal that the right of a man to retreat into his
256
own home stands at the very core of the Fourth Amendment.
Without question, the majority’s holding would be strengthened
if the community caretaker exception were to apply to the home. In
Judge Evander’s words, “If the community caretaker exception was
found to be applicable to residences, then the State’s interest in seeking prompt reunification . . . should be given significant weight . . .
However, if the . . . exception is inapplicable, then . . . the State’s argu257
ment must fail.”

252
253
254
255
256
257

Id. at 603 (quoting R. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 330 (2008)).
Id.
Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274, 280-81 (Fla. 2005).
Bell, supra note 61, at 3 (citing People v. Ray, 981 P.2d 928, 937 (Cal. 1999)).
LANDYNSKI, supra note 19, at 43.
Ortiz, 24 So. 3d at 617 (Evander, J., dissenting).
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According to Judge Torpy, author of one of the concurring opinions, “Cady does not compel, and there is no logical basis for, a distinction between vehicles and residences for purposes of assessing
whether police acted reasonably in conducting a noncriminal search
258
under their caretaking function.” Essentially, there were two issues
in Cady: whether the search was unreasonable solely because the offi259
cer lacked a warrant, and whether the search was otherwise unrea260
sonable under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Judge
Torpy’s view, the distinction drawn between automobiles and homes
was implemented simply to answer the first issue of unreasonableness
261
absent a warrant. The second issue of reasonableness in light of the
Fourth Amendment did not require a distinction between homes and
automobiles since the court stated that “[t]he Framers . . . have given
us only the general standard of ‘unreasonableness’ as a guide in determining whether searches . . . meet the standard of that Amendment
262
. . . where a warrant is not required.”
The problem with this reasoning is that the second issue (unreasonableness within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment) is dependent upon the first (unreasonableness absent a warrant). In Cady,
the general standard of “reasonableness” was implemented by the
Court in view of the fact that a search of the trunk did not require a
263
warrant. The only reason the search of the car did not require a warrant was that, unlike homes, cars are ambulatory in nature, and police
264
officers often come into frequent noncriminal contact with them.
The distinction between cars and dwellings led to the search being
lawful absent a warrant, which in turn led to the Court implementing a
265
standard of overall reasonableness to answer the second inquiry.
Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court interpreted Cady as expressly
266
limiting the community caretaker exception to vehicles. As a result,
the majority in Ortiz erred in giving weight to the officer’s attempt to
reunite the child with his parents.
But what about the need to balance our inclinations to have police officers perform caretaking functions against our need to be protected from warrantless searches? As the majority underscored, “[we
live] in a day and age where society expects police officers to be deep258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266

Id. at 607 (Torpy, J., concurring).
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973).
Id. at 442.
Ortiz, 24 So. 3d at 606.
Cady, 413 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added).
Id. at 447-48.
Id. at 441-42.
See id. at 447-48.
Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274, 280 n.1 (Fla. 2005).
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ly involved in humanitarian and life . . . [and are expected to engage
in] protecti[ve] actions that go beyond traditional law enforcement
267
duties.” Even if the ideals expressed in Cady were not extended to
the home, there would not be a “far-reaching negative effect” on law
enforcement officials.
Officers are still able to perform warrantless domestic searches
when there is a true indication of an ongoing medical emergency or
even ongoing criminal behavior as provided for by the exigent circumstances exception. If the search in Ortiz could not be clearly justified
by either of these existing exceptions, then perhaps the situation was
not that of an ongoing emergency in which there was no time to secure a warrant. Even though the officer acted on what were clearly
good-faith intentions, he always had the option of leaving the child
with the Department of Children and Families until the house could
be properly searched.
Although the court had good intentions in affirming the decision
by trying not to discourage police officers from undertaking humanitarian actions, it very well may have created a new Fourth Amendment exception that allows for warrantless entry into the home whenever police reasonably believe that they are performing a community
268
caretaking function.
Such an exception is overly broad, open to
abuse, and significantly infringes on the protection that homes are
afforded under the Fourth Amendment. In fact, Fourth Amendment
rights would have been better served if the court analyzed the search
under a strict application of the emergency aid doctrine, based on the
objective belief that there was an ongoing emergency at the time the
garage door was opened. The emergency aid exception is wellrecognized and does not present a threat to the firm line drawn between the home and the government.
Although an analysis of this type would not favor the majority’s
view as much as one giving extra credence to an officer’s community
caretaking functions, it nonetheless would have been more consistent
with the Florida Supreme Court’s prior stance on the community care269
taker exception.
As the case was decided, Ortiz indirectly goes
against Florida precedent by allowing a warrantless search that was, at
least in part, motivated and undertaken by actions that fall under the
heading of a community caretaking function.

267

Ortiz v. State, 24 So. 3d 596, 597 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 597. “[T]he view of the original panel decision had potentially far-reaching negative effects on the actions of law-enforcement officers . . . .” Id.
269 Riggs, 918 So. 2d at 280 n.1.
268
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VI. PROTECTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: FLORIDA SHOULD LIMIT
THE COMMUNITY CARETAKER DOCTRINE TO AUTOMOBILES
Protection of privacy against unwarranted intrusion remains the
key function of the Fourth Amendment and should always be consid270
ered by Florida courts. Because there were no delineated standards
of reasonableness or probable cause set forth in Cady, it stands to reason that when police are not investigating criminal activity, their
search is justified whenever they believe there is a danger that threat271
ens the well-being of the community. This opens the door to creating
a sizeable warrant exception that could consume the general rule.
When the Court first recognized caretaker functions, it also acknowledged that there was a difference in privacy, based on contact with the
272
general public, between a vehicle and a home. It is difficult to accept
that the Court would have intentionally set such a low threshold for a
new exception when it had previously stated that “physical entry of
the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
273
Amendment is directed.”
Granted, there are exceptions to the Fourth Amendment recognizing that certain searches promote a legitimate governmental inter274
est.
However, these searches have carefully-delineated standards;
both the exigent circumstances doctrine and the emergency aid doctrine require probable cause and good faith based on objective rea275
sonableness. Furthermore, they both apply in situations that are expressly limited in scope and thus pose no danger to become infinitely
276
broad. As Ortiz v. State illustrates, judges will not always agree as to
whether the standards for objective reasonableness within a certain
exception have been satisfied. Nevertheless, the basic requirements
for doctrines such as the emergency aid doctrine remain identifiable
277
and have been agreed upon by most courts.
Such a claim is not
278
available to the community caretaker doctrine.

270

See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
See generally Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
272 Cady, 413 U.S. at 441-42.
273 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (quoting United States v. U.S. District
Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
274 See People v. Bennett, 949 P.2d 947, 955-56 (Cal. 1998).
275 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978); Seibert v. State, 923 So. 2d 460, 468 (Fla.
2006) (stating “[w]hether sufficient exigent circumstances exist is evaluated based on the totality
of the circumstances”); see State v. Wakeford, 953 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Mont. 1998) (articulating
probable cause and good faith as exigent circumstance requirements).
276 See discussion supra Parts II.B-C.
277 See discussion supra Part II.C.
278 See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
271
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Absent a more definitive interpretation of the community caretaker doctrine from the United States Supreme Court, Florida courts
should do their utmost to construe the exception in accordance with
279
the Supreme Court’s construction. Although reasonable minds may
280
differ as to what Cady specifically stood for, the Florida Supreme
Court has explicitly stated that the caretaker analysis in Cady is lim281
ited to the automobile context. In keeping with the privacy interests
of the Fourth Amendment, as well as the plain language of Cady and
Riggs, Florida should continue to unite with other state and federal
jurisdictions in resisting the temptation to expand the community
282
caretaker doctrine. Already-existing Fourth Amendment exceptions
serve the need to place human life above household privacy and recognize that there is not always an opportunity to obtain a warrant dur283
ing an ongoing emergency.
If Florida allows yet another Fourth
Amendment exception to exist, especially one as broad as the community caretaker doctrine, the State risks completely destroying a
fundamental right whose sanctity has been recognized since well be284
fore the American Revolution. Such sacrifice of given rights is not
285
justified in the name of “maximum simplicity.”
Unfortunately, when petitioned to hear Ortiz, the Florida Su286
preme Court declined jurisdiction. While this decision would imply
that the court found no conflict between the holdings in Riggs and
Ortiz, a valuable opportunity to ultimately correct the position that

279 See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (requiring Florida courts to decide search issues in accordance with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment).
280 See Ortiz v. State, 24 So. 3d 596, 606-07 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (Torpy, J., concurring), for the contention that Cady v. Dombrowski does not compel a distinction between vehicles and residences.
281 Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274, 280 n.1 (Fla. 2005) (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433, 441-42 (1973)).
282 See, e.g., United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that the
court has never explicitly held community caretaking functions as applying to private homes);
United States v. Erickson, 991 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1993) (refusing to extend the community caretaker function to warrantless search of residence); United States v. Pichany, 687 F.2d 204 (7th Cir.
1982) (declining to extend the community caretaker function to warrantless search of warehouse); United States v. Bute, 43 F.3d 531 (10th Cir. 1994) (repudiating the argument that community caretaking functions allow for warrantless searches of private homes); N.D. v. Gill, 755
N.W.2d 454 (N.D. 2008) (limiting the community caretaker exception to automobiles); Wood v.
Virginia., 497 S.E.2d 484, 487 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (refusing to extend the community caretaker
exception to warrantless searches of a home).
283 See discussion supra Parts II.B-C.
284 “[O]verriding respect for the sanctity of the home . . . has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980).
285 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 192 (1990) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
393 (1978)).
286 Ortiz v. State, 37 So. 3d 848 (Fla. 2010) (unpublished).
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287

the community caretaker exception was squandered. Even if there
was no conflict between the two cases, the Florida Supreme Court has
288
jurisdiction to review cases of great public importance. Although the
court did address non-criminal Fourth Amendment exceptions in
Riggs, its focus on the subject was brief, and the issue remains unresolved as evidenced by Ortiz.
The court should have granted the motion for rehearing to state
that, regardless of whether the officer in Ortiz had an objective reason
to believe that an ongoing medical emergency was taking place, there
would be no further expansion of the community caretaker exception.
In other words, Riggs would remain the standard, regardless of the
arguably dissimilar outcome in Ortiz. As the law currently stands,
Ortiz leaves the door open for further Fourth Amendment erosion
because it implies that community caretaker functions authorize warrantless entry.
As mentioned throughout this comment, much of the unnecessary extension from the community caretaker doctrine stems from
confusion over which Fourth Amendment exception should be ap289
plied in any given situation. It is easy to hold the point of view that
categorizing numerous exceptions under various headings is merely a
matter of semantics. After all, they stand for the same basic ideal that
police should be able to enter a dwelling when they reasonably be290
lieve that an emergency exists. Nevertheless, when the standards for
each recognized exception are met, the presumption that the search in
291
Conversely, when a new
question was unreasonable is rebutted.
standard is created, such as a version of the community caretaking
doctrine that extends to the home, there is no evidence that the presumption of unreasonableness is rebutted, especially since “for the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional differ292
ence between houses and cars.” Only by carefully delineating the
various Fourth Amendment exceptions, and then holding that Cady is
limited to automobiles, will the issue be properly settled.
Although it may be tempting to widen Cady by labeling other exceptions under the broad heading of “community caretaking” duties,
287 The Florida Supreme Court has jurisdiction to “review any decision of a district court of
appeal that passes upon a question certified by it to be of great public importance, or that is
certified by it to be in direct conflict with a decision of another district court of appeal.” FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 3(b)(4).
288 Id.
289 See discussion supra Part IV.
290 Id.
291 See Riggs v. State, 918 So. 2d 274, 278 (Fla. 2005).
292 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973) (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42, 52 (1970)).
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this blurs the line unnecessarily. While it may be an important governmental and societal interest not to discourage police officers from
293
performing those duties labeled as community caretaking functions,
there are already Fourth Amendment exceptions that serve this very
294
purpose. No matter whether officers’ intentions are just or their actions are unrelated to crime-fighting, not every warrantless search
should be considered lawful. Florida courts must remember that
physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the Fourth
Amendment is directed, and should retain the policy that the commu295
nity caretaker doctrine does not extend beyond the scope of vehicles.
VII. CONCLUSION
By continuing to carve out Fourth Amendment exceptions and
expand already-existing ones, courts do nothing more than erode the
basic principles on which the Fourth Amendment was premised. No
matter how well-intentioned police officers may be, our society should
not sacrifice fundamental rights in the name of simplicity. As Justice
Douglas once opined, the Fourth Amendment is for the innocent and
296
guilty alike. If losing evidence is the price society pays for the freedom guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, let us hope that the
courts continue to view the Fourth Amendment as being worth that
price. To protect “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their . . .
297
houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures,” Florida
courts should interpret the community caretaker exception as it was
intended – limited to automobile searches.
293 Because officers who enter dwellings to perform caretaking functions are acting in good
faith, the argument could be made that a new exception to the exclusionary rule may be on the
horizon. The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to protect Fourth
Amendment rights. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). It operates by allowing
courts to render evidence inadmissible if obtained during a search that violated Fourth Amendment immunities. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960). The purpose of the rule is
to deter and prevent police misconduct. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 n.3 (1979). One
of the recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule is that of good faith. United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 911-12 (1984). In Leon, the Court created the good faith exception by recognizing
that at a certain point the detrimental consequences of an illegal police action become so attenuated that “the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.” Id. at 911
(quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975)). Although this comment does not advocate for nor denounce an expansion to the good faith exception, the case could be made that
because an officer’s intentions are easy to recognize under the community caretaker exception,
as well as the existence of a legitimate societal interest in having caretaker functions performed,
a considerable number of problems could be obviated if the exclusionary rule were further loosened.
294 See discussion supra Parts II.B-C.
295 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
296 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
297 Cady, 413 U.S. at 439 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IV).

